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Abstract
It is often asumed that monetary policy in forward looking models yields higher welfare,
measured in terms of the unconditional loss, when it operates under the timeless perspec-
tive than under discretion. This paper consider the robustness of such a result in a New
Keynesian model when the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence is misperceived by the
policymaker. It finds that for reasonable parameter values discretion can be superior to the
timeless perspective. The reason for this stems from the fact that the timeless perspective
policy varies more with the degree of inflation persistence than does the discretionary policy.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers whether the timeless perspective approach to optimal monetary policy
remains superior to discretionary policymaking in the presence of parameter uncertainty. This
uncertainty is modelled in terms of misperceptions, on the part of the monetary authority, of the
degree of intrinsic inflation persistence in a New Keynesian model with a hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve. Among its key findings, this paper shows that discretionary monetary policy
can indeed be superior when a widely used metric, the unconditional loss function, is used.
Moreover, this result is derived using reasonable parameter values, unlike previous research
that has been critical of the timeless perspective approach.
The work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Currie and Levine (1993) have shown the im-
portance of credibility and commitment for policymaking in models with rational expectations.
In the absence of some form of enforceable commitment optimal policies will be time inconsis-
tent. However, the alternative time consistent (discretionary) equilibrium in forward looking
models results in lower welfare due to the stabilisation bias, whereby inflation is stabilised too
little in favour of low volatility in output. Woodford (1999b) has shown that using a stan-
dard loss function discretion implies too little inertia in the inflation process; in response to a
cost-push shock, the optimal commitment process implies a period of below average inflation in
order to fully exploit expectations. By contrast, under discretion the policymaker re-optimises
every period so that it is unable to use expectations in order to improve on the inflation-output
stabilisation trade-off. Consequently, the discretionary equilibrium results in lower welfare than
the optimal commitment policy when these are compared in terms of average outcomes of the
conditional expectation of the loss function.
Nevertheless, optimal commitment policies suffer from an initial period problem; with pre-
determined expectations it is optimal for the policymaker to exploit those expectations in the
startup period but to promise never to do so again in the future. As a result, such a perspective
to optimal monetary policy has generally been regarded as undesirable. To overcome the initial
value problem, whilst still maintaining the benefits of commitment, Woodford (1999a) has put
forward the concept of the timeless perspective (TP). The TP policy can be understood as
the policy that would be currently in place had the optimal commitment plan begun to be
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implemented in the distant past. Such an approach would imply that the effects of the initial
period will have already died out, so that they will not be relevant for the optimal policy as it
is currently being implemented. This implies that the policy reaction function is constrained to
be the same in all periods, including the startup period.
By overcoming the initial period problem the timeless perspective has gained many adherents
in the optimal monetary policy literature, to the extent that in much recent research the only
commitment approach to policy used is the TP policy.1 Moreover, the use of the TP for policy
analysis by Norges Bank is further evidence of its popularity.
Whilst the TP remains the dominant approach to optimal commitment policies, recent
research has highlighted some of its limitations. In particular, by not exploiting expectations
in the initial period - in other words, ignoring the first order conditions in the first period
that the policy is being implemented - the TP policy yields lower welfare than the optimal
commitment policy. On this, Jensen and McCallum (2002) and Blake (2001) show that using
the standard criterion for assessing policies, the unconditional expectation of the policymaker’s
objective function, an alternative policy rule can yield outcomes that are superior to the TP
policy, the so called Blake-Jensen-McCallum TP policy.2 Moreover, with its greater emphasis
on short term optimisation, it is also possible for discretion to yield superior outcomes to the
timeless perspective equilibrium, as pointed out by Blake (2001) and Sauer (2007). However,
their results show that the relative superiority of the discretionary equilibrium arises with
implausible parameter values, so that the general result that has emerged is that in forward
looking models the TP policy is superior to discretion.
It should be pointed out that the conclusion above is dependent on the welfare criterion being
used. Dennis (2008) has argued in favour of using conditional loss to compare alternative policy
perspectives. This has the effect of making the loss function, the welfare criterion, dependent
on the initial state, in which case it is straightforward to show that there will be states for which
discretion is superior to the timeless perspective. This aspect is ignored when the unconditional
expectation is used, as the timeless perspective and the optimal commitment policy deliver
the same asymptotic equilibrium, hence the same unconditional loss. The issue of what the
1See for example Walsh (2004, 2005b).
2Put another way, TP policies are not optimal when view from the timeless perspective.
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appropriate perspective for monetary policy should be is also considered by McCallum (2005).
He argues that both the timeless perspetive and the Blake-Jensen-McCallum policies possess a
key critcal property: continuity. This occurs when a rule implemented at some point after the
startup yields a condition that coincides with the condition for that same period that the policy
would have specified in previous periods. However, the key difference between the two is that
the timeless perspective performs relatively better in terms of responding to shocks whereas the
BJM policy is superior on average with regard to transitional effects.
Therefore, despite its limitations and potential for alternative policies to be superior, it is
generally considered that when the unconditional loss is used as the measure of welfare, the
timeless perspective is superior to discretion. However, is such a conclusion warranted when in
the presence of parameter uncertainty? The research cited above has focused on the criteria
used to compare alternative policies and the conditions under which one policy perspective is
superior to another. However, they have all assumed that the policymaker knows the model’s
parameter values.
This paper investigates the relative superiority of these two policy equilibria in a New
Keynesian model when the policymaker misperceives the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence,
and finds that for reasonable parameter values discretion is the more robust policy. Such a
modelling approach to analysing parameter uncertainty has been widely employed within the
context of optimal monetary policy, but this has been primarily carried out in the context of
what the optimal perception of inflation persistence should be.3 In this regard, using a standard
quadratic loss function Walsh (2004), Angeloni et al. (2003) and Coenen (2007) argue that it is
better to over-estimate the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. By contrast, Walsh (2005b)
finds that the robust policy when the structural loss function is used calls for assuming an
intermediate degree of inflation persistence. These papers have largely focused on the timeless
perspective or optimised interest rate rules. In contrast to this, Leitemo (2007) finds that under
discretion and using the structural loss function it is optimal to assume no inflation persistence.
3For a thorough overview, see Levin and Moessner (2005).
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2 A Near-Canonical New Keynesian Model
The results of this paper will focus on a standard New Keynesian model with intrinsic inflation
persistence, as analysed by Clarida et al. (1999), McCallum and Nelson (2004), Woodford
(2003), and Walsh (2005a), among others. Aggregate supply is modelled by the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC):
pit = θEtpit+1 + (1− θ)pit−1 + αyt + ut 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (1)
where pit is the rate of inflation, yt is the output gap and ut ∼ iid[0,Ω] is an error term. One
could think of this error term as representing shocks to firms’ desired markups. The degree of
inflation persistence is given by (1−θ), so that the higher the value of θ the more 1 resembles the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. It is worth pointing out that several micro-founded modifications
to the NKPC (rule of thumb pricing, indexation to past inflation) can result in a Phillips curve
of the form (1) above.4 The rationale behind the inclusion of intrinsic inflation persistence in
the Phillips curve is primarily empirical, with Fuhrer (1997) and Roberts (2005) among others
finding that inflation is primarily backward looking, in contrast to Gali and Gertler (1999) who
argue that the NKPC provides a good description of inflationary dynamics. What these papers
highlight is that there is considerable disagreement on how persistent inflation is. That is the
reason this paper focuses on uncertainty about θ, a feature that will be of central importance in
the results that follow. As this paper only considers shocks to the Phillips curve one can assume
without loss of generality that the monetary authority is able to control the inflation rate as an
instrument, in which case it is not necessary to include the IS relationship in the analysis.
2.1 Monetary Policy Objectives
In order to close the model an objective function is required. One could use the representative
agent’s discounted lifetime utility as the policy objective. Doing so would have the benefit of
being consistent with the assumptions underlying the hybrid Phillips curve in (1),5. However,
4Benigno and Woodford (2005), Amato and Laubach (2003) and Steinsson (2003) among others.
5In this case clearer micro-foundations would have been required.
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the drawback is that such an objective would be dependent on the assumptions which resulted
in (1) being the relevant Phillips curve. Given that (1) is observationally equivalent to different
pricing assumptions the conclusions would be highly model-specific. More importantly though,
inflation targeting central banks’ remits are not to maximise some measure of social welfare.
Rather, they are given the task of stabilising inflation and some measure of real activity,6 with
the former being regarded as relatively more important than the latter. Therefore, the policy
objective used in this paper will be to minimise a standard loss function:
Lt = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[pi2t + ωy
2
t ] (2)
Where ω represents the relative weight attached to output gap stabilisation. Nevertheless,
it is assumed that the monetary authority does not know the true value of θ, so that it aims to
minimise its loss (2) subject to its perceived Phillips curve, given by:
pit = θˆEtpit+1 + (1− θˆ)pit−1 + αyt + ut (3)
Where θˆ represents the central bank’s perception of θ. The resulting first order conditions
for the optimal commitment solution, in addition to the Phillips curve, are given by:
ωyt + αλt = 0 t ≥ 0 (4)
pit + β
−1θˆλt−1 − λt + β(1− θˆ)Eˆtλt+1 = 0 t > 0 (5)
pit − λt + β(1− θˆ)λt+1 t = 0 (6)
Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Phillips curve constraint. Given that
6See Svensson (2002).
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this model explores the role of parameter misperceptions, this is reflected in Eˆ, which represents
the central bank’s rational expectation conditional on its perceived model (θˆ).
The time inconsistency of the optimal consistent policy can be seen from the implications
of (5) and (6) above. The latter is the first order condition for the startup period and does not
contain λt−1. In other words, there are no previous (expectational) commitments in the first
period so that it is optimal for the policymaker to exploit the fact that expectations are initially
fixed. Therefore, the first order conditions for inflation in all subsequent periods imply different
behaviour from that in the startup period.
Woodford’s approach (the timeless perspective) overcomes this type of time inconsistency
by assuming that the only first order condition for inflation that applies is (5). By ignoring
the first order condition in the startup period the TP policy can can be regarded as the policy
that would be currently in place had it first been implemented in the distant past.7 Therefore,
combining (4) and (5) yields the following optimal targeting rule under the TP:
pit = −
ω
α
[yt − β
−1θˆyt−1 − β(1− θˆ)Eˆtyt+1] (7)
By contrast, the optimal targeting rule under discretion is given by:
pit = −
ω
α
[(1− θˆηpi)yt − β(1− θˆ)Eˆtyt+1] (8)
where time consistency is ensured by the fact that when the monetary authority re-optimises
each period it takes into account the dependence of next period’s inflation on current inflation.
This implies that Eˆtpit+1 in the Phillips curve (3) is repaced with its minimum state variable
(MSV) solution, as yet unknown, consistent with the monetary authority’s beliefs.8 Thus ηpi
represents the elasticity of inflation with respect to its previous value in the MSV solution. To see
why the discretionary policy does not vary so much with misperceptions a quantitative example
7Because the TP policy does not make use of initial conditions it can be inferior to alternative policies, even
of the same form. See Jensen and McCallum (2002) or Blake (2001).
8See McCallum and Nelson (2004).
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will clarify this. Using the calibrated values discussed below, θˆ = 0.1 yields ηpi = 0.65, which falls
to 0.09 when θˆ = 0.9. As a result, when inflation changes from being predominantly backward
to forward-looking the effect on policy implementation under discretion is much smaller than
under commitment and this will be the key to understanding the results that follow.
Studies that have compared the relative performance of the TP and discretionary policies
have found that for reasonable parameter values the superiority of TP policies remains a robust
result. As McCallum and Nelson (2004) point out ‘in all cases examined, the unconditional
average performance of timeless perspective policymaking is at least as good as that provides
by optimal discretionary behaviour’. Nevertheless, as shown by Sauer (2007) discretion becomes
relatively more attractive as the discount factor β decreases or the weight attached to output
gap stabilisation (ω) rises. Following McCallum (2005) the former result is rather intuitive; the
TP policy performs well in terms of responding to shocks, but it is not as good - on average- with
respect to transitional dynamics. A lower β emphasises the latter, shfting the balance in favour
of discretion. In addition to this, Dennis (2008) shows how a lower α, that is, a flatter Phillips
curve, makes discretion a relatively more attractive policy. However, it is worth pointing out
that most of the authors who have considered this issue have focused on the NKPC. Allowing
for intrinsic inflation persistence makes the TP policy more attractive, given that the cost of
not influencing inflation expectations will be larger.
2.2 Model Solution
Before proceeding to the results it is worth discussing briefly how the model is solved when the
policymaker misperceives the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. Both policies, discretion
and the timeless perspective, contain expectations of future output. As these pertain to the
central bank they must be solved conditional on its perceived model. Therefore, the solution
proceeds in two steps. First, the models are solved for each value of θ in the absence of
misperceptions, from which the MSV solution is derived. This is then used to replace Eˆtyt+1
with its solution for each policy to ensure consistency. Lastly, having solved for the expectations
in each of the optimal targeting rules (7) and (8) these equations are solved jointly with the
hybrid NKPC.
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Table 1: Calibrated Values
α β ω σu
0.1 0.99 1/16 1
In both cases the solution of the models can be written as
zt = mzt−1 + nut (9)
where z′t = [y
′
t pi
′
t], so that the loss function can also be represented as
Lt = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjz
′
t+jWzt+j W =

 ω 0
0 1


Given the above and following Dennis (2007), the value of the loss function is calculated by
the following
Lt =
[
z′t−1H
′PˆHzt−1 + v
′
tG
′PˆGvt +
β
1− β
tr
(
G′PˆGΩ
)]
This is the method to calculate the results that follow. Comparing the two policies, it is
worth noting that as perceptions of θ vary, it is the TP policy that will be altered the most.
The reason for this is that although in both cases it is optimal to focus on stabilising inflation
- relative to output- the more persistent it is, but as θˆ decreases ηpi also decreases in (8), partly
offsetting the policy change under the discretionary equilibrium.
3 Calibration and Model Results
The model’s parameter values are the same as those used by McCallum and Nelson (2004) and
are chosen to be consistent with empirical estimates (Gali and Gertler (1999)). These are shown
in 1. A value of ω = 0.0625 indicates that both output and inflation stabilisation carry equal
weights in the loss function and will be used as a benchmark.9 However, the effects of alterating
the value of this parameter will be discussed below.
9For inflation targeting central banks this value should therefore provide a realistic ceiling.
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Figure 1: Losses under the timeless perspective relative to discretionary policy.
In order to consider the relative merits of discretionary over TP policymaking a metric is
needed. For this paper the metric is
V = 100
Ld
Ltp
(12)
Where Ld and Ltp denote (unconditional) losses under discretion and the timeless perspective
policies, respectively. Therefore, the two policies yield the same welfare measure when V equals
100, with rises in V representing relatively larger losses arising from discretionary policy. In
addition to this, one can also consider, from a robustness point of view, what the worst scenario
implies for each policy. Given how V is measured this can be observed by comparing the highest
and lowest values in V as deviations from 100.
Figure (1) shows the effects of misperceptions about θ with ω and α taking their benchmark
values. In the absence of misperceptions (along the main diagonal) the TP policy is superior
to discretion, except when θ = 0, since with a fully backward Phillips curve both policies yield
identical results. Moreover, the TP is relatively more beneficial as inflation becomes a more
forward-looking process due to the greater stabilisation bias under discretion. However, once
misperceptions are taken into account, the appeal of the TP policy vanishes when the monetary
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Figure 2: Impulse respones to a unit shock to the Phillips curve. θ = 0.9, and with mispercep-
tions θˆ = 0.1
authority assumes that inflation is predominantly forward looking but is in fact highly persistent.
The reason for this result can be gleaned from an analysis of the impulse response functions
under each policy. An example of this is shown in Figure (2), which displays the impulse
responses to a unit shock to the Phillips curve. To understand the effects of misperceptions the
figure shows the results with and without misperceptions. For the latter θˆ = θ = 0.9, and the
results can be seen from the two figures on the left. The two figures on the right show the effects
of misperceptions (θˆ = 0.1), so that the monetary authority perceives inflation to be much more
persistent than it actually is. Under the timeless perspective the effect of overestimating the
degree of inflation persistence is a greater attempt stabilise inflation, the result of which is that
although the initial response to the shocks is almost identical, with misperceptions inflation
rapidly returns to steady state. It then follows that the contraction in output is larger, but
more importantly, the effect of misperceptions under the timeless perspective is to alter the
variables’ dynamics. Using incorrect parameter values prevents the monetary authority from
making best use of private sector expectations and hence results in lower welfare. By contrast,
under discretion the model’s dynamics remain largely unchanged; overestimating the degree of
inflation persistence in this case is akin to attaching a lower weight on the output gap in th eloss
function. Whilst this again results in inflation being over-stabilised, the consequences for the
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Figure 3: Difference in impulse responses with and without misperceptions, derived from Figure
(2) above.
both inflation and output are not altered to the same extent as under the timeless perspective.
The consequences of misperceptions can be seen more clearly in Figure (3), which shows the
differences in the impulse responses with and without misperceptions for each policy perspective.
Whilst the initial response of inflation to the shock is similar under both policies it is under
the TP that misperceptions have a longer lasting effect, and this is therefore reflected in the
behaviour of output. This confirms the statement above that under the timeless perspective
misperceptions cause larger policy changes than under discretion, the reason being that θˆ and
ηypi move in oppossite directions under the latter policy. The result of this is that discretion can
be the more robust policy when the actual degree of intrinsic inflation persistence is unknown.
4 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the implications of misperceptions about the degree of intrinsic inflation
persistence for optimal monetary policy in a forward looking rational expectations model. It
has used an ad hoc loss function for two main reasons: it better reflects the behaviour of central
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banks and alternative theoretical underpinnings can equally give rise to a hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve, so that it is not clear which structural loss function should be used. The paper
finds that misperceptions about structural inflation persistence cause larger policy changes
under the timeless perspective than under discretionary policymaking. It is generally agreed
that comparing these two policy perspectives using the uncondtional loss function the timeless
perspective generates lower losses under all reasonable parameter values. This paper has shown
that even under such a welfare criterion discretion can be the superior policy when the degree
of inflation persistence is unknown. This calls into question the desirability of implementing
timeless perspective policymaking in policy analysis, as is currently being done by Norges Bank.
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